Delegated Portfolio Management, Benchmarking, and the Effects on Financial Markets
We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark-a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relativeperformance- based objectives, investors have reduced e...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
2015
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers
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| Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | We analyze the implications of linking the compensation of fund managers to the return of their portfolio relative to that of a benchmark-a common solution to the agency problem in delegated portfolio management. In the presence of such relativeperformance- based objectives, investors have reduced expected utility but markets are typically more informative and deeper. Furthermore, in a multiple asset/market framework we show that (i) relative performance concerns lead to an increase in the correlation between markets (financial contagion); (ii) benchmark inclusion increases price volatility; (iii) home bias emerges as a rational outcome. When information is costly, information acquisition is hindered and this attenuates the effects on informativeness and depth of the market |
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| Physical Description: | 39 pages |
| ISBN: | 9781513586878 |