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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451874501
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100 |
1 |
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|a Chan-Lau, Jorge
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt
|c Jorge Chan-Lau
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2001
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300 |
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|a 12 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a Korea, Republic of
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653 |
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|a Payment Systems
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653 |
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|a Banks
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653 |
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|a Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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653 |
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|a Regimes
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653 |
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|a Deflation
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653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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653 |
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|a Mortgages
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653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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653 |
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|a External debt
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653 |
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|a Money
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653 |
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|a Standards
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653 |
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|a Currencies
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Banking
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653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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653 |
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|a Government and the Monetary System
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653 |
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|a Inflation
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653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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653 |
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|a Stocks
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653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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653 |
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|a Economic sectors
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653 |
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|a International economics
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653 |
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|a Debts, External
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653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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653 |
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|a Price Level
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
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|a Investments: Stocks
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653 |
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|a Monetary Systems
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653 |
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|a Corporate Governance
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653 |
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|a Prices
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653 |
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|a Role & responsibilities of boards & directors
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653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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653 |
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|a Corporate governance
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653 |
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|a Debt financing
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451874501.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/204/001.2001.issue-204-en.xml?cid=15528-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders
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