The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt

This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chan-Lau, Jorge
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2001
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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100 1 |a Chan-Lau, Jorge 
245 0 0 |a The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt  |c Jorge Chan-Lau 
260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2001 
300 |a 12 pages 
651 4 |a Korea, Republic of 
653 |a Payment Systems 
653 |a Banks 
653 |a Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation 
653 |a Banks and banking 
653 |a Regimes 
653 |a Deflation 
653 |a Exports and Imports 
653 |a Mortgages 
653 |a International Lending and Debt Problems 
653 |a External debt 
653 |a Money 
653 |a Standards 
653 |a Currencies 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Banking 
653 |a Depository Institutions 
653 |a Government and the Monetary System 
653 |a Inflation 
653 |a Institutional Investors 
653 |a Pension Funds 
653 |a Stocks 
653 |a Monetary economics 
653 |a Financial institutions 
653 |a Financial Instruments 
653 |a Micro Finance Institutions 
653 |a Economic sectors 
653 |a International economics 
653 |a Debts, External 
653 |a Non-bank Financial Institutions 
653 |a Price Level 
653 |a Banks and Banking 
653 |a Investments: Stocks 
653 |a Monetary Systems 
653 |a Corporate Governance 
653 |a Prices 
653 |a Role & responsibilities of boards & directors 
653 |a Investment & securities 
653 |a Money and Monetary Policy 
653 |a Corporate governance 
653 |a Debt financing 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b IMF  |a International Monetary Fund 
490 0 |a IMF Working Papers 
028 5 0 |a 10.5089/9781451874501.001 
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520 |a This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders