Cover Image
Read Now

The Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on the Agency Cost of Debt

This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Chan-Lau, Jorge
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2001
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Payment Systems
Banks
Corporate Finance And Governance: Government Policy And Regulation
Banks And Banking
Regimes
Deflation
Exports And Imports
Mortgages
International Lending And Debt Problems
External Debt
Money
Corporate Governance; Role & Responsibilities Of Boards & Directors
Standards
Currencies
Macroeconomics
Banking
Depository Institutions
Inflation
Government And The Monetary System
Institutional Investors
Pension Funds
Stocks
Monetary Economics
Financial Institutions
Financial Instruments
Micro Finance Institutions
International Economics
Economic Sectors
Debts, External
Non-bank Financial Institutions
Price Level
Investments: Stocks
Monetary Systems
Corporate Governance
Prices
Investment & Securities
Money And Monetary Policy
Debt Financing
Korea, Republic Of
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:This paper uses a stochastic continuous time model of the firm to study how different corporate governance structures affect the agency cost of debt. In the absence of asymmetric information, it shows that control of the firm by debtholders with a minority stake delays the exit decision and reduces the underinvestment problem. Such a governance structure may play an important role in diminishing conflicts between shareholders and debtholders
Physical Description:12 pages
ISBN:9781451874501

Similar Items