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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451852301
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Chamon, Marcos
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a Can Debt Crises Be Self-Fulfilling?
|c Marcos Chamon
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2004
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| 300 |
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|a 21 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Securities
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Financial instruments
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| 653 |
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|a Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: General
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| 653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debt default
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Crises
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/099/001.2004.issue-099-en.xml?cid=17414-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enough other investors do so as well. This suggests that runs on the debt of a single borrower (such as the government) can be eliminated, and that self-fulfilling features are more plausible when articulated in a context in which externalities among many decentralized borrowers allow for economy-wide debt runs to occur
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