Can Debt Crises Be Self-Fulfilling?
Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enou...
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
2004
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Series: | IMF Working Papers
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | |
Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Summary: | Several papers argue that debt crises can be the result of self-fulfilling expectations that no one will lend to a country. I show this type of coordination failure can be eliminated by a combination of state-contingent securities and a mechanism that allows investors to promise to lend only if enough other investors do so as well. This suggests that runs on the debt of a single borrower (such as the government) can be eliminated, and that self-fulfilling features are more plausible when articulated in a context in which externalities among many decentralized borrowers allow for economy-wide debt runs to occur |
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Physical Description: | 21 pages |
ISBN: | 9781451852301 |