Bank Bailouts Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing “value effect” that more than outweighs the mora...
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
1999
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Series: | IMF Working Papers
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Online Access: | |
Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Summary: | This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing “value effect” that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy |
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Physical Description: | 30 pages |
ISBN: | 9781451852875 |