Bank Bailouts Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect
This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweigh...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
1999
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| Series: | IMF Working Papers
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| Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | This paper shows that a central bank, by announcing and committing ex-ante to a bailout policy that is contingent on the realization of certain states of nature (for example on the occurrence of an adverse macroeconomic shock), creates a risk-reducing 'value effect' that more than outweighs the moral hazard component of such a policy |
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| Physical Description: | 30 pages |
| ISBN: | 9781451852875 |