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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451848793
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Gershenson, Dmitry
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Sanctions and Civil Conflict
|c Dmitry Gershenson
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2001
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| 300 |
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|a 37 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a South Africa
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Income
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| 653 |
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|a Secession
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| 653 |
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|a Labour; income economics
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Personal income
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| 653 |
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|a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
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| 653 |
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|a Federalism
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Designs and Consistency
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| 653 |
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|a Conflict
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| 653 |
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|a Welfare Economics: General
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
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| 653 |
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|a Defense spending
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| 653 |
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|a National Security and War
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
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|a Alliances
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption; Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Coordination
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Objectives
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| 653 |
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|a Labor Economics: General
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Wages
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| 653 |
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|a Intergovernmental Relations
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| 653 |
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|a Conflict Resolution
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Labor economics
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451848793.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/066/001.2001.issue-066-en.xml?cid=15117-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases
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