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Sanctions and Civil Conflict

Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gershenson, Dmitry
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2001
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Wealth
Income
Secession
Labour; Income Economics
Public Finance & Taxation
Saving
Personal Income
Wages, Compensation, And Labor Costs: General
Federalism
Policy Designs And Consistency
Conflict
Welfare Economics: General
National Accounts
Personal Income, Wealth, And Their Distributions
Defense Spending
National Security And War
Labor
Expenditure
Alliances
Consumption; Economics
Policy Coordination
Policy Objectives
Labor Economics: General
Expenditures, Public
Consumption
Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics: Consumption
Wages
Intergovernmental Relations
Conflict Resolution
Public Finance
Labor Economics
South Africa
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases
Physical Description:37 pages
ISBN:9781451848793

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