Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Garcia, G.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2000
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2000 
300 |a 80 pages 
651 4 |a United States 
653 |a Economic & financial crises & disasters 
653 |a Depository Institutions 
653 |a Distressed institutions 
653 |a Commercial banks 
653 |a Banks 
653 |a Finance 
653 |a Financial crises 
653 |a Banks and banking 
653 |a Industries: Financial Services 
653 |a Financial sector policy and analysis 
653 |a Bank resolution 
653 |a Financial institutions 
653 |a Financial services 
653 |a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation 
653 |a Micro Finance Institutions 
653 |a Corporate Finance and Governance: General 
653 |a Deposit insurance 
653 |a Crisis management 
653 |a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation 
653 |a Mortgages 
653 |a Financial risk management 
653 |a Banks and Banking 
653 |a Financial Institutions and Services: General 
653 |a Financial services industry 
653 |a Banking 
653 |a Moral hazard 
653 |a Bank deposits 
653 |a Actuarial Studies 
653 |a Financial Risk Management 
653 |a Finance: General 
653 |a Insurance Companies 
653 |a Insurance 
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520 |a A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee