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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451847765
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100 |
1 |
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|a Garcia, G.
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management
|c G. Garcia
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2000
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300 |
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|a 80 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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653 |
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|a Distressed institutions
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653 |
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|a Commercial banks
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653 |
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|a Banks
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653 |
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|a Finance
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653 |
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|a Financial crises
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653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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653 |
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|a Financial sector policy and analysis
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653 |
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|a Bank resolution
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653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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653 |
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|a Financial services
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653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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653 |
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|a Corporate Finance and Governance: General
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653 |
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|a Deposit insurance
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653 |
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|a Crisis management
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653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Mortgages
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653 |
|
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|a Financial risk management
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
|
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: General
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653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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653 |
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|a Banking
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653 |
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|a Moral hazard
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653 |
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|a Bank deposits
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653 |
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|a Actuarial Studies
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653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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653 |
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|a Finance: General
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653 |
|
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|a Insurance Companies
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653 |
|
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|a Insurance
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451847765.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/057/001.2000.issue-057-en.xml?cid=3498-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee
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