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Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Garcia, G.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2000
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
General Financial Markets: Government Policy And Regulation
Corporate Finance And Governance: General
Moral Hazard
Banks
Banks And Banking
Insurance
Bank Resolution
Economic & Financial Crises & Disasters
Financial Sector Policy And Analysis
Micro Finance Institutions
Financial Services Industry
Finance
Mortgages
Financial Institutions
Depository Institutions
Crisis Management
Actuarial Studies
Bank Deposits
Industries: Financial Services
Insurance Companies
Banking
Financial Institutions And Services: General
Commercial Banks
Distressed Institutions
Financial Institutions And Services: Government Policy And Regulation
Finance: General
Financial Risk Management
Financial Crises
Financial Services
Deposit Insurance
United States
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee
Physical Description:80 pages
ISBN:9781451847765

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