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Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management

A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Garcia, G.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2000
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Economic & Financial Crises & Disasters
Depository Institutions
Distressed Institutions
Commercial Banks
Banks
Finance
Financial Crises
Banks And Banking
Industries: Financial Services
Financial Sector Policy And Analysis
Bank Resolution
Financial Institutions
Financial Services
General Financial Markets: Government Policy And Regulation
Micro Finance Institutions
Corporate Finance And Governance: General
Deposit Insurance
Crisis Management
Financial Institutions And Services: Government Policy And Regulation
Mortgages
Financial Risk Management
Financial Institutions And Services: General
Financial Services Industry
Banking
Moral Hazard
Bank Deposits
Actuarial Studies
Finance: General
Insurance Companies
Insurance
United States
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee
Physical Description:80 pages
ISBN:9781451847765

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