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180413 ||| eng |
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|a 9780191604034
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|a 0191604038
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4 |
|a B105.E65
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|a Mackie, Penelope
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|a How things might have been
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b individuals, kinds, and essential properties
|c Penelope Mackie
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| 260 |
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|a Oxford
|b Clarendon
|c 2006, 2006
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| 300 |
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|a xii, 212 p.
|b ill
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| 505 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index
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| 653 |
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|a Essentialism (Philosophy)
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b OUP
|a Oxford University Press
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|u http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272204.001.0001?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 111.1
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|a Penelope Mackie looks at an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. She challenges widely held views and arrives at what she calls a minimalist essentialism
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