How things might have been individuals, kinds, and essential properties

Penelope Mackie looks at an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. She challenges widely held views and arrives at what she calls a minimalist essentialism

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mackie, Penelope
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Clarendon 2006, 2006
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:Penelope Mackie looks at an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. She challenges widely held views and arrives at what she calls a minimalist essentialism
Physical Description:xii, 212 p. ill
ISBN:9780191604034
0191604038