Introduction to the Theory of Games
Approach your problems from the right It isn't that they can't see the solution. end and begin with the answers. Then It is that they can't see the problem. one day, perhaps you will find the final question. G. K. Chesterton. The Scandal of Father Brown 'The Point of a Pin'....
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
1985, 1985
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1985 |
| Series: | Mathematics and its Applications, East European Series
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- 29.2. The Selten-model
- 29.3. Dynamic processes and games with limited information about the pay-off function
- Epilogue
- References
- Name Index
- 1. On equilibrium of systems
- 1.1. Basic ideas
- 1.2. Chains and traversable regions
- 1.3. Equilibrium point, stability set, equilibrium set
- 1.4. “Equilibrium properties” of equilibrium points and equilibrium sets
- 1.5. On the existence of an equilibrium point
- 1.6. On the existence of stability sets
- 2. The n-person game
- 3. Existence theorems of equilibrium points
- 4. Special n-person games and methods to solve them
- 4.1. Mathematical programming methods for the solution of n-person concave games
- 4.2. Generalized polyhedral games
- 4.3. Solution of n-person zero-sum concave-convex games
- 4.4. Concave games with unique equilibrium points
- 5. The Scarf-Hansen algorithm for approximating an equilibrium point of a finite n-person game
- 6. The oligopoly game
- 6.1. The reduction principle
- 6.2. The general multiproduct case
- 6.3. The general linear case
- 6.4. The single-product case
- 7. Two-person games
- 8. Bimatrix games
- 19. Two-person zero-sum games over metric spaces sequential games
- 20. Sequential games
- 20.1. Shapley’s stochastic game
- 20.2. Recursive games
- 21. Games against nature
- 22. Cooperative games in characteristic function form
- 23. Solution concepts for n-person cooperative games
- 23.1. The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution
- 23.2. The core
- 23.3. The strong e-core
- 23.4. The kernel
- 23.5. The nucleolus
- 23.6. The Shapley-value
- 24. Stability of pay-off configurations
- 25. A bargaining model of cooperative games
- 26. The solution concept of nash for n-person cooperative games
- 27. Examples of cooperative games
- 27.1. A linear production game
- 27.2. A market game
- 27.3. The cooperative oligopoly game
- 27.4. A game theoretic approach for cost allocation: a case
- 27.5. Committee decision making as a game
- 28. Game theoretical treatment of multicriteria decision making
- 29. Games with incomplete information
- 29.1. The Harsanyi-model
- 8.1. Basic definitions and some simple properties of bimatrix games
- 8.2. Methods for solving bimatrix games
- 8.3. Examples
- 9. Matrix games
- 9.1. Equilibrium and the minimax principle
- 9.2. The set of equilibrium strategies
- 10. Symmetric games
- 11. Connection between matrix games and linear programming
- 12. Methods for solving general matrix games
- 12.1 Solution of matrix games by linear programming
- 12.2. Method of fictitious play
- 12.3. von Neumann’s method
- 13. Some Special Games and methods
- 13.1. Matrices with saddle-points
- 13.2. Dominance relations
- 13.3. 2 x n games
- 13.4. Convex (concave) matrix games
- 14. Decomposition of matrix games
- 15. Examples of matrix games
- 15.1. Example 1
- 15.2. Example 2
- 16. Games played over the unit square
- 17. Some special classes of games on the unit square
- 18.Approximate solution of two- person zero-sum games played over the unit square