Algorithmic Game Theory Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings
Other Authors: | , , |
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2010, 2010
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Edition: | 1st ed. 2010 |
Series: | Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | |
Collection: | Springer eBooks 2005- - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets
- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games
- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games
- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
- Responsive Lotteries
- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It
- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy
- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms
- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time
- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant
- Truthful Fair Division
- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand
- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties
- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games
- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games