Algorithmic Game Theory Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings

Bibliographic Details
Other Authors: Kontogiannis, Spyros (Editor), Koutsoupias, Elias (Editor), Spirakis, Paul (Editor)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010, 2010
Edition:1st ed. 2010
Series:Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer eBooks 2005- - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
  • How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
  • A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets
  • Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
  • Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
  • Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
  • Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
  • On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games
  • Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games
  • On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
  • On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
  • On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
  • A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
  • Responsive Lotteries
  • On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
  • Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
  • A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It
  • The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
  • Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
  • Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy
  • Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
  • On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms
  • Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time
  • The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant
  • Truthful Fair Division
  • No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand
  • On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
  • 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties
  • On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games
  • Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games