|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
03370nmm a2200397 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB000385442 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000000238494 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
130626 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9783642161704
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Kontogiannis, Spyros
|e [editor]
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Algorithmic Game Theory
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Third International Symposium, SAGT 2010, Athens, Greece, October 18-20, 2010, Proceedings
|c edited by Spyros Kontogiannis, Elias Koutsoupias, Paul Spirakis
|
| 250 |
|
|
|a 1st ed. 2010
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Berlin, Heidelberg
|b Springer Berlin Heidelberg
|c 2010, 2010
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a VIII, 359 p. 25 illus
|b online resource
|
| 505 |
0 |
|
|a When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers -- How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard? -- A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets -- Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market -- Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games -- Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics -- Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games -- On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games -- Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games -- On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play -- On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria -- On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games -- A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Responsive Lotteries -- On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users -- Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games -- A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It -- The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements -- Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting -- Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy -- Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations -- On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms -- Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time -- The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant -- Truthful Fair Division -- No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand -- On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria -- 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties -- On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear BottleneckCongestion Games -- Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Models of Computation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Computers and Society
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Computer science
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Electronic commerce
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Numerical Analysis
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Computer simulation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Computer Modelling
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Numerical analysis
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a e-Commerce and e-Business
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Theory of Computation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Computers and civilization
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Koutsoupias, Elias
|e [editor]
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Spirakis, Paul
|e [editor]
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b Springer
|a Springer eBooks 2005-
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a Information Systems and Applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 003.3
|