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130626 ||| eng |
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|a 9783642027918
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|a Höhn, Michaela Isabel
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|a Relational Supply Contracts
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements
|c by Michaela Isabel Höhn
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 2010
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| 260 |
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|a Berlin, Heidelberg
|b Springer Berlin Heidelberg
|c 2010, 2010
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| 300 |
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|a XVI, 124 p. 27 illus
|b online resource
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|a Literature Review on Supply Chain Contracts -- Relational Contracts -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Quantity Flexibility -- Relational Contracts and Optimal Buy-Back Price -- QF vs. Buy-Back Contract in Buyer-Supplier Relationships -- Case Study: Supplier Relationship Management at Volkswagen Group -- Conclusion and Outlook
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| 653 |
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|a Operations research
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| 653 |
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|a Optimization
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| 653 |
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|a Procurement
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| 653 |
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|a Quantitative Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Econometrics
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| 653 |
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|a Mathematical optimization
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| 653 |
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|a Operations Research and Decision Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Industrial procurement
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b Springer
|a Springer eBooks 2005-
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|a Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
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|a 10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 658.72
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|a Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contracts is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model
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