How Binding is Supervisory Guidance? Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning

This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Fiordelisi, Franco
Other Authors: Mare, David S., Lattanzio, Gabriele
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C The World Bank 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a How Binding is Supervisory Guidance?  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b Evidence from the European Calendar Provisioning  |c Franco Fiordelisi 
260 |a Washington, D.C  |b The World Bank  |c 2022 
300 |a 36 pages 
653 |a Banking Supervision 
653 |a Cross-Border Financial Institutions 
653 |a Financial Stability 
653 |a Banking Regulation 
653 |a Law and Development 
653 |a Supervisory Guidance 
653 |a Non-Performing Loans 
653 |a Financial Regulation and Supervision 
653 |a European Calendar Provisioning 
653 |a Finance and Financial Sector Development 
653 |a Basel Committee 
653 |a Bank Capital Adequacy 
653 |a Banking Law 
700 1 |a Mare, David S. 
700 1 |a Lattanzio, Gabriele 
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520 |a This paper investigates whether banks respond differently to supervisory guidance than to specific regulatory action. Using a sample of subsidiaries of European banks operating in developing countries, the study exploits the sequencing in the supervisory and regulatory implementation of a reform on provisioning for credit losses for identification, generally referred to as European calendar provisioning. While the reform achieved the intended goal of reducing European banks' nonperforming loan ratios, its effects were greater during the initial implementation of the supervisory guidance than after its enactment as a binding regulation. This finding is consistent with the notion that the subsequent formalization of the supervisory initiative within a regulatory framework achieved limited results because it eliminated the flexibility the regulatory authority had concerning the stringency with which European calendar provisioning was enforced. Finally, the study offers evidence of a mechanism through which policies in advanced economies affect banking outcomes in developing countries to which their local financial authorities should be alert