|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
03706nmm a2200733 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB002176251 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000001314028 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
231004 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9798400244919
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a David, Antonio
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Unpleasant Surprises? Elections and Tax News Shocks
|c Antonio David, Can Sever
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2023
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 35 pages
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Probit models
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Stabilization
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Taxes
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Proportions
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Economics of specific sectors
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Currency crises
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Business Taxes and Subsidies
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Income tax systems
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Econometrics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Econometrics & economic statistics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Spendings tax
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Income tax
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Treasury Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Econometric analysis
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Economics: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Corporations; Taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Informal sector; Economics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Corporate income tax
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Econometric models
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Consumption taxes
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Corporate Taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Corporate & business tax
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Institutions and the Macroeconomy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Discrete Regressors
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Sever, Can
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9798400244919.001
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2023/139/001.2023.issue-139-en.xml?cid=534334-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a Unanticipated changes in tax policy are likely to have different macroeconomic effects compared to anticipated changes due to several mechanisms, including fiscal foresight and policy uncertainty. It is therefore important to understand what drives such policy surprises. We explore the nature of unanticipated tax policy changes by focusing on a political economy determinant of those events, namely the timing of elections. Using monthly data for 22 advanced economies and emerging markets over the period 1990-2018, we show that implementation lags tend to be significantly longer for tax policy change announcements that are made during the pre-election periods, thereby leading to a lower likelihood of “tax news shocks”. We also find that implementation lags become much shorter for tax policy changes that are announced in the aftermath of elections, generating more frequent tax news shocks. This pattern remains similar for different tax measures or types of taxes. The findings are robust to a number of checks, including alternative definitions of tax news shocks, or to controlling for various economic and institutional factors
|