The Logic of the CAP Politics or Economics?
This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperativ...
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| Other Authors: | , |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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| Series: | Other papers
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| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios |
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