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221013 ||| eng |
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|a Barth, James R.
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| 245 |
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|a The Evolution and Impact of Bank Regulations
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c James R. Barth
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2012
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| 300 |
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|a 27 p
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1 |
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|a Caprio, Gerard
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| 700 |
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|a Barth, James R.
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| 700 |
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|a Levine, Ross
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1596/1813-9450-6288
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| 856 |
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-6288
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a This paper reassesses what works in banking regulation based on the new World Bank survey (Survey IV) of bank regulation and supervision around world. The paper briefly presents new and official survey information on bank regulations in more than 125 countries, makes comparisons with earlier surveys since 1999, and assesses the relationship between changes in bank regulations and banking system performance. The data suggest that many countries made capital regulations more stringent and granted greater discretionary power to official supervisory agencies over the past 12 years, but most countries have not enhanced the ability and incentives of private investors to monitor banks rigorously-and several have weakened such private monitoring incentives. Although it is difficult to draw causal inferences from these data, and while there are material cross-country differences in the evolution of regulatory reforms, existing evidence suggests that many countries are making counterproductive changes to their bank regulations by not enhancing the ability and incentives of private investors to scrutinize banks
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