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221013 ||| eng |
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|a Strand, Jon
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| 245 |
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|a Strategic Climate Policy with Offsets and Incomplete Abatement
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Carbon Taxes versus Cap-and-Trade
|c Jon Strand
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2011
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| 300 |
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|a 41 p
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| 700 |
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|a Strand, Jon
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1596/1813-9450-5675
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| 856 |
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/1813-9450-5675
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a This paper provides a first analysis of optimal offset policies by a "policy bloc" of fossil fuel importers implementing a climate policy, facing a (non-policy) fringe of other importers, and a bloc of fuel exporters. The policy bloc uses either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, jointly with a fully efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is then shown to prefer a tax over a cap-and-trade scheme, since 1) a tax extracts more rent as fuel exporters reduce the export price, and more so when the policy bloc is larger relative to the fringe; and 2) offsets are more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is half the tax rate; under a cap-and-trade scheme the quota and offset price are equal. The domestic carbon and offset price are both higher under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme when the policy bloc is small; when it is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap-and-trade scheme. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, and more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower, and since the price obtained when selling offsets is often higher (always so for a large fringe)
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