Political alternation as a restraint on investing in influence evidence from the post-communist transition
"The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
2008
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| Series: | Policy research working paper
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| Collection: | World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | "The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power. "--World Bank web site |
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| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/12/2009 |