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221013 ||| eng |
100 |
1 |
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|a David, Antonio C.
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245 |
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|a Are Price-Based Capital Account Regulations Effective In Developing Countries ?
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c David, Antonio C
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2007
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300 |
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|a 27 p.
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
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653 |
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|a International Economics & Trade
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653 |
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|a Currencies and Exchange Rates
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653 |
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|a Financial Liberal
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653 |
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|a Asset Price
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653 |
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|a Exchange
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653 |
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|a Capital Flows
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653 |
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|a Emerging Markets
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653 |
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|a Bank Policy
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653 |
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|a Balance Sheets
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653 |
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|a Debt Markets
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653 |
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|a Private Sector Development
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653 |
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|a Emerging Economies
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653 |
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|a Finance and Financial Sector Development
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653 |
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|a Economic Theory and Research
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653 |
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|a Capital Account
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomic Management
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking Reform
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653 |
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|a Developing Countries
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653 |
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|a Boom-Bust Cycle
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653 |
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|a Capital Inflows
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700 |
1 |
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|a David, Antonio C.
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4175
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a The author evaluates the effectiveness of policy measures adopted by Chile and Colombia, aiming to mitigate the deleterious effects of pro-cyclical capital flows. In the case of Chile, according to his Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) analysis, capital controls succeeded in reducing net short-term capital flows but did not affect long-term flows. As far as Colombia is concerned, the regulations were capable of affecting total flows and also long-term ones. In addition, the co-integration models indicate that the regulations did not have a direct effect on the real exchange rate in the Chilean case. Nonetheless, the model used for Colombia did detect a direct impact of the capital controls on the real exchange rate. Therefore, the results do not seem to support the idea that those regulations were easily evaded
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