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221013 ||| eng |
| 100 |
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|a Dinar, Ariel
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| 245 |
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|a Water Allocation Strategies For The Kat Basin In South Africa
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b Comparing Negotiation Tools And Game Theory Models
|c Dinar, Ariel
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2006
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|a 28 p.
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| 653 |
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|a Catchment Management
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|a Water and Industry
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|a Flow
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|a Environment
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|a Lead
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| 653 |
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|a Water Supply and Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Natural Resources
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| 653 |
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|a Rural Development
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|a Meters
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|a Industry
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| 653 |
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|a Domestic Water Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Water Use
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| 653 |
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|a Water Supply and Sanitation
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| 653 |
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|a Water Resources
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|a Groundwater
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|a Storage Capacity
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|a Environmental Economics and Policies
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|a Rainfall
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|a Town Water Supply and Sanitation
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| 653 |
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|a Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Catchment
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| 653 |
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|a Catchments
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| 653 |
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|a Irrigation
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| 653 |
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|a Water Conservation
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|a Dinar, Ariel
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|a Patrone, Fioravante
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|a Rowntree, Kate
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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| 856 |
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4083
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Governments and developing agencies promote participatory approaches in solving common pool resource problems, such as in the water sector. Two main participatory approaches have been applied separately, namely negotiation and mediation. In this paper the authors apply the Role-Playing Game that is a component of the Companion Modeling approach, a negotiation procedure, and the Cooperative Game Theory (Shapley value and the Nucleolus solution concepts) that can be mirrored as a mediated mechanism to a water allocation problem in the Kat watershed in South Africa. While the absolute results of the two approaches differ, the negotiation and the cooperative game theory provide similar shares of the benefit allocated to the players from various cooperative arrangements. By evaluating the two approaches, the authors provide useful tips for future extension for both the Role-Playing Games and the Cooperative Game Theory applications
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