The creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization

"How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets ca...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hoff, Karla Ruth
Corporate Author: National Bureau of Economic Research
Other Authors: Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research 2005
Series:NBER working paper series
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a The creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization  |c Karla Hoff, Joseph E. Stiglitz 
260 |a Cambridge, MA  |b National Bureau of Economic Research  |c 2005 
653 |a Right of property / Developing countries 
653 |a Rule of law / Developing countries 
653 |a Privatization / Developing countries 
653 |a Post-communism / Developing countries 
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500 |a Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/7/2005 
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520 |a "How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site