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221013 ||| eng |
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|a Ravallion, Martin
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|a Land Allocation in Vietnam's Agrarian Transition
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c Ravallion, Martin
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|a Washington, D.C
|b The World Bank
|c 2003
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| 300 |
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|a 32 p.
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
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| 653 |
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|a Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction
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| 653 |
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|a Land
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| 653 |
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|a Political Economy
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| 653 |
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|a Environment
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| 653 |
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|a Historical Context
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| 653 |
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|a Cost
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| 653 |
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|a Land Use and Policies
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| 653 |
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|a Forestry
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| 653 |
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|a Rural Development
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| 653 |
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|a Urban Development
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| 653 |
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|a Market
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a Urban Housing
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| 653 |
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|a Price Variation
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| 653 |
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|a Poverty Reduction
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| 653 |
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|a Municipal Housing
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| 653 |
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|a Communities & Human Settlements
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| 653 |
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|a Private Sector Development
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| 653 |
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|a Climate Change
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| 653 |
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|a Efficiency
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Contract
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| 653 |
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|a Market Economy
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| 653 |
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|a Allocation
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|a Ravallion, Martin
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|a Walle, de van Dominique
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b WOBA
|a World Bank E-Library Archive
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|u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2951
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a While liberalizing key factor markets is a crucial step in the transition from a socialist control-economy to a market economy, the process can be stalled by imperfect information, high transaction costs, and covert resistance from entrenched interests. Ravallion and van de Walle study land-market adjustment in the wake of Vietnam's reforms aiming to establish a free market in land-use rights following de-collectivization. Inefficiencies in the initial administrative allocation are measured against an explicit counterfactual market solution. The authors' tests using a farm-household panel data set spanning the reforms suggest that land allocation responded positively but slowly to the inefficiencies of the administrative allocation. They find no sign that the transition favored the land rich or that it was thwarted by the continuing power over land held by local officials. This paper—a joint product of the Poverty Team and the Public Services Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the welfare impacts of major policy reforms
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