Family altruism and incentives
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Corporate Author: | |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth
2000
|
| Series: | Policy research working paper
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding |
|---|---|
| Item Description: | "December 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 37-38). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 30, 2002 |