Market discipline and financial safety net design
It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and reg...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Washington, DC
World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance
1999
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| Series: | Policy research working paper
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| Collection: | World Bank E-Library Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks |
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| Item Description: | "September 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29) |
| Physical Description: | 44 p 28 cm |