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220928 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781484325278
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100 |
1 |
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|a Cerra, Valerie
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Financial Crises, Investment Slumps, and Slow Recoveries
|c Valerie Cerra, Mai Hakamada, Ruy Lama
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2021
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300 |
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|a 30 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a Brazil
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653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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653 |
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|a Labour; income economics
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653 |
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|a Financial crises
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653 |
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|a Self-employed
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653 |
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|a Economics: General
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653 |
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|a Capital and Total Factor Productivity
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653 |
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|a Cost
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653 |
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|a Industrial productivity
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653 |
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|a Production
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653 |
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|a Informal sector; Economics
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653 |
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|a Total factor productivity
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653 |
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|a Labor
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653 |
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|a Economics of specific sectors
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653 |
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|a Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
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653 |
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|a Currency crises
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653 |
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|a Cycles
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653 |
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|a Global financial crisis of 2008-2009
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
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|a Self-employment
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653 |
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|a Labor Demand
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653 |
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|a Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Banking crises
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653 |
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|a Business Fluctuations
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653 |
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|a Capacity
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653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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653 |
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|a Financial Crises
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653 |
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|a Production and Operations Management
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700 |
1 |
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|a Hakamada, Mai
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700 |
1 |
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|a Lama, Ruy
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781484325278.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2021/170/001.2021.issue-170-en.xml?cid=461271-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a One of the most puzzling facts in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is that output across advanced and emerging economies recovered at a much slower rate than anticipated by most forecasting agencies. This paper delves into the mechanics behind the observed slow recovery and the associated permanent output losses in the aftermath of the crisis, with a particular focus on the role played by financial frictions and investment dynamics. The paper provides two main contributions. First, we empirically document that lower investment during financial crises is the key factor leading to permanent loss of output and total factor productivity (TFP) in the wake of a crisis. Second, we develop a DSGE model with financial frictions and capital-embodied technological change capable of reproducing the empirical facts. We also evaluate the role of financial policies in stabilizing output and TFP in response to disruptions in financial markets
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