Competition vs. Stability: Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk

This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For larg...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Capelle, Damien
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2021
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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100 1 |a Capelle, Damien 
245 0 0 |a Competition vs. Stability: Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk  |c Damien Capelle 
260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2021 
300 |a 74 pages 
653 |a Economics 
653 |a Banks 
653 |a Finance 
653 |a Industries: Financial Services 
653 |a Banks and banking 
653 |a Investment banking 
653 |a Financial services 
653 |a Deflation 
653 |a Competition 
653 |a Mortgages 
653 |a Economics of specific sectors 
653 |a Asset prices 
653 |a Informal Economy 
653 |a Shadow banking 
653 |a Foreign Exchange 
653 |a Currency crises 
653 |a Financial markets 
653 |a International Economics 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Banking 
653 |a Brokerage 
653 |a Bank deposits 
653 |a Venture Capital 
653 |a Law and legislation 
653 |a Depository Institutions 
653 |a Economic & financial crises & disasters 
653 |a Inflation 
653 |a Institutional Investors 
653 |a Pension Funds 
653 |a Investment Banking 
653 |a Financial Instruments 
653 |a Economics: General 
653 |a Micro Finance Institutions 
653 |a Informal sector 
653 |a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) 
653 |a Non-bank Financial Institutions 
653 |a Price Level 
653 |a Nonbank financial institutions 
653 |a Banks and Banking 
653 |a Ratings and Ratings Agencies 
653 |a Prices 
653 |a Underground Econom 
653 |a Finance: General 
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989 |b IMF  |a International Monetary Fund 
490 0 |a IMF Working Papers 
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520 |a This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect