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220928 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781513550817
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| 100 |
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|a Bergant, Katharina
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| 245 |
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|a Forbearance Patterns in the Post-Crisis Period
|c Katharina Bergant, Thore Kockerols
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2020
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| 300 |
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|a 43 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Ireland
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Asset requirements
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| 653 |
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|a Capital adequacy requirements
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Bankruptcy
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| 653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Nonperforming loans
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| 653 |
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|a Money
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| 653 |
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|a Loans
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| 653 |
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|a Financial risk management
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| 653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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| 653 |
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|a Credit risk
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| 653 |
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|a Goodwill
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Liquidation
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| 653 |
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|a Financial regulation and supervision
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Kockerols, Thore
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781513550817.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/140/001.2020.issue-140-en.xml?cid=49587-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Using supervisory loan-level data on corporate loans, we show that banks facing high levels of non-performing loans relative to their capital and provisions were more likely to grant forbearance measures to the riskiest group of borrowers. More specifically, we find that risky borrowers are more likely to get an increase in the overall limit or the maturity of a loan product from a distressed lender. As a second step, we analyse the effectiveness of this practice in reducing the probability of default. We show that the most common measure of forbearance is effective in the short run but no forbearance measure significantly reduces the probability of default in the long run. Our evidence also suggests that forbearance and new lending are substitutes for banks, as high shares of forbearance are negatively correlated with new lending to the same group of borrowers. Taken together, these findings can help policy makers shape surveillance and regulation in a future recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic
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