|
|
|
|
LEADER |
03257nmm a2200637 u 4500 |
001 |
EB002078678 |
003 |
EBX01000000000000001218768 |
005 |
00000000000000.0 |
007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
008 |
220928 ||| eng |
020 |
|
|
|a 9781513525891
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Cebotari, Aliona
|
245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Natural Disaster Insurance for Sovereigns: Issues, Challenges and Optimality
|c Aliona Cebotari, Karim Youssef
|
260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2020
|
300 |
|
|
|a 34 pages
|
651 |
|
4 |
|a Costa Rica
|
653 |
|
|
|a Insurance companies
|
653 |
|
|
|a Institutional Investors
|
653 |
|
|
|a Pension Funds
|
653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
653 |
|
|
|a International relief
|
653 |
|
|
|a Natural Disasters and Their Management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Industries: Financial Services
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial institutions
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Forecasting and Simulation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Natural Disasters
|
653 |
|
|
|a Environment
|
653 |
|
|
|a Disaster aid
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Instruments
|
653 |
|
|
|a Climate
|
653 |
|
|
|a Options
|
653 |
|
|
|a Exports and Imports
|
653 |
|
|
|a International economics
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Lending and Debt Problems
|
653 |
|
|
|a Investments: Options
|
653 |
|
|
|a Derivative securities
|
653 |
|
|
|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
|
653 |
|
|
|a Global Warming
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Fiscal Issues
|
653 |
|
|
|a Foreign Aid
|
653 |
|
|
|a Foreign aid
|
653 |
|
|
|a Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
|
653 |
|
|
|a Natural disasters
|
653 |
|
|
|a Actuarial Studies
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Public Goods
|
653 |
|
|
|a Insurance Companies
|
653 |
|
|
|a Insurance
|
653 |
|
|
|a Insurance & actuarial studies
|
700 |
1 |
|
|a Youssef, Karim
|
041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781513525891.001
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/003/001.2020.issue-003-en.xml?cid=48925-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
520 |
|
|
|a Natural disasters are a source of economic risks in many countries, especially in smaller and lower-income states, and ex-ante preparedness is needed to manage the risks. The paper discusses sovereign experience with disaster insurance as a key instrument to mitigate the risks; proposes ways to judge the adequacy of insurance; and considers ways to enhance its use by vulnerable countries. The paper especially aims to inform policy decisions on disaster insurance. Through simulations of natural disasters and various insurance options, we find that sovereign decisions on optimal risk transfer involve balancing trade-offs between growth and debt, based on government risk preferences and country risk exposure. The choice of optimal insurance for smaller countries turns out to be more constrained by cost considerations due to their higher exposure, likely resulting in underinsurance; donor grants could help them achieve a more optimal protection. We also find that optimal insurance packages are those that are least costly relative to expected payouts (i.e. have the lowest insurance multiple), which are also the packages that insure less severe (more frequent) disasters
|