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220928 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781513517155
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Furceri, Davide
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a The Political Costs of Reforms
|b Fear or Reality?
|c Davide Furceri, Jun Ge, Jonathan Ostry, Chris Papageorgiou, Gabriele Ciminelli
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2019
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| 300 |
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|a 30 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Spain
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment Insurance
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| 653 |
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|a Cross-Country Output Convergence
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Productivity
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a Capital account
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| 653 |
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|a Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Measurement of Economic Growth
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| 653 |
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|a Institutions and Growth
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| 653 |
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|a Economics of Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Structural reforms
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| 653 |
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|a Short-term Capital Movements
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| 653 |
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|a Current account
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| 653 |
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|a Political Economy
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| 653 |
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|a Financial sector reform
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Current Account Adjustment
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| 653 |
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|a Balance of payments
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal consolidation
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| 653 |
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|a Macrostructural analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Severance Pay
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| 653 |
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|a Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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| 653 |
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|a Plant Closings
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| 653 |
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|a Institutions and the Macroeconomy
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| 653 |
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|a Financial regulation and supervision
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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| 653 |
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|a Finance: General
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Ge, Jun
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Ostry, Jonathan
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Papageorgiou, Chris
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a Staff Discussion Notes
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781513517155.006
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/006/2019/008/006.2019.issue-008-en.xml?cid=48735-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Many countries are experiencing persistent, weak medium-term growth and limited fiscal space. Against this background, economic policy agendas—in both advanced and developing economies—are focusing increasingly on structural reforms. While there is broad agreement on the economic benefits of structural reforms, the political-economy of reform is less settled. This is because reforms may generate gains only in the longer term while distributional effects may be sizable in the short run, and because governments may lack political capital to confront vocal interest groups. In these circumstances, politicians may hold back on reforms, fearing they will be penalized at the ballot box. The aim of this Staff Discussion Note is to examine whether the fear of a political cost associated with structural reforms is justified by the available evidence, and whether there are lessons from the data about how reform strategies might be designed to mitigate potential political costs. It provides a major addition to recent IMF analysis examining the output and employment effect of reforms
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