Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self a critical-phenomological analysis

In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one's sense...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Stanier, Jessica, Miglio, Nicole (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cham (CH) Springer 2021, 2021
Online Access:
Collection: National Center for Biotechnology Information - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
LEADER 02418naa a2200241 u 4500
001 EB002072133
003 EBX01000000000000001212223
005 00000000000000.0
007 tu|||||||||||||||||||||
008 220923 r ||| eng
100 1 |a Stanier, Jessica 
245 0 0 |a Painful experience and constitution of the intersubjective self  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b a critical-phenomological analysis  |c Jessica Stanier and Nicole Miglio 
260 |a Cham (CH)  |b Springer  |c 2021, 2021 
300 |a 1 PDF file (page 101-114) 
700 1 |a Miglio, Nicole  |e [author] 
740 0 2 |a Phenomenology of bioethics 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b NCBI  |a National Center for Biotechnology Information 
500 |a Chapter 8 of the book: Phenomenology of bioethics. Cham : Springer, 2021 
773 0 |t Phenomenology of bioethics 
856 4 0 |u https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK569899  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 610 
520 |a In this paper, we discuss how phenomenology might cogently express the way painful experiences are layered with complex intersubjective meaning. In particular, we propose a critical conception of pain as an intricate multi-levelled phenomenon, deeply ingrained in the constitution of one's sense of bodily self and emerging from a web of intercorporeal, social, cultural, and political relations. In the first section, we review and critique some conceptual accounts of pain. Then, we explore how pain is involved in complex ways with modalities of pleasure and displeasure, enacted personal meaning, and contexts of empathy or shame. We aim to show why a phenomenology of pain must acknowledge the richness and diversity of peculiar painful experiences. The second section then weaves these critical insights into Husserlian phenomenology of embodiment, sensation, and localisation. We introduce the distinction between Body-Object and Lived-Body to show how pain presents intersubjectively (e.g. from a patient to a clinician). Furthermore, we stress that, while pain seems to take a marginal position in Husserl's whole corpus, its role is central in the transcendental constitution of the Lived-Body, interacting with the personal, interpersonal, and intersubjective levels of experiential constitution. Taking a critical-phenomenological perspective, we then concretely explore how some people may experience structural conditions which may make their experiences more or less painful