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210512 ||| eng |
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|a 9783039437733
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|a 9783039437740
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|a books978-3-03943-774-0
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Golman, Russell
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a Behavioral Game Theory
|h Elektronische Ressource
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| 260 |
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|a Basel, Switzerland
|b MDPI - Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
|c 2021
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| 300 |
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|a 1 electronic resource (128 p.)
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| 653 |
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|a social preferences
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| 653 |
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|a two-stage games
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| 653 |
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|a learning
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| 653 |
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|a cognitive load
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| 653 |
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|a social welfare
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| 653 |
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|a payoff dominance
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| 653 |
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|a n/a
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| 653 |
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|a cognitive reflection ability
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| 653 |
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|a ultimatum game
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| 653 |
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|a strategic thinking
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| 653 |
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|a reflection
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| 653 |
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|a decomposition
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| 653 |
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|a case-based decision theory
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| 653 |
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|a belief formation
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| 653 |
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|a potential games
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| 653 |
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|a pareto efficient equilibria
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| 653 |
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|a strategic communication
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| 653 |
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|a innovation diffusion
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| 653 |
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|a third-party punishment
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| 653 |
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|a level-k reasoning
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| 653 |
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|a behavioral game theory
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| 653 |
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|a externalities
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| 653 |
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|a dictator game
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| 653 |
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|a endogenous depth of reasoning
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| 653 |
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|a guessing game
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| 653 |
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|a risk dominance
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| 653 |
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|a intuition
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| 653 |
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|a Economics, finance, business & management / bicssc
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Golman, Russell
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b DOAB
|a Directory of Open Access Books
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| 500 |
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|a Creative Commons (cc), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.3390/books978-3-03943-774-0
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://www.mdpi.com/books/pdfview/book/3287
|7 0
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 856 |
4 |
2 |
|u https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/68278
|z DOAB: description of the publication
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| 082 |
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|a 361
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| 082 |
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|a 380
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| 082 |
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|a 700
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|a 330
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|a How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they're rational and can somehow predict each other's behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They often do not conform to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium, or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social preferences, bounded rationality (for example, limited iterated reasoning), and learning from experience. This book brings together new advances in the field of behavioral game theory that help us understand how people actually make strategic decisions in game-theoretic situations.
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