Crafting consensus why central bankers change their speech and how speech changes the economy

'Crafting Consensus' offers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Baerg, Nicole
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York, NY Oxford University Press 2020, 2020
Series:Oxford scholarship online / Oxford scholarship online
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Crafting consensus  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b why central bankers change their speech and how speech changes the economy  |c Nicole Baerg 
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300 |a 1 online resource  |b illustrations (black and white) 
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653 |a Banks and banking, Central / Language 
653 |a Communication in financial institutions 
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520 |a 'Crafting Consensus' offers a new theory of committee decision making and provides a rich understanding of modern-day central banking by studying central banks' communication with the public. Using extensive empirical analysis, Nicole Baerg explains how central bank transparency depends on the configuration of central bank committee members' preferences and the institutional rules governing how committee members set policy. The text shows that monetary policy committees comprised of bankers with opposing inflation preferences communicate more precisely and that precise communication then has positive economic effects