Corruption and economic development

Corruption is an almost universal and persistent feature of the modern state. Commentators primarily view corruption as a major obstacle to development, whereas dissenting voices claim that corruption has the power to facilitate trade that would otherwise not have taken place. Written by the editors...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dutta, Jayasri
Other Authors: Aidt, Toke
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Northampton, MA Edward Elgar Pub. 2016, c. 2016
Series:The international library of critical writings in economics
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Edward Elgar eBook Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Table of Contents:
  • The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2), May, 703-45
  • Includes bibliographical references and index
  • Theory and Evidence', Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (2), June, 195-220
  • Erich Gundlach and Martin Paldam (2009), 'The Transition of Corruption: From Poverty to Honesty', Economics Letters, 103 (3), June, 146-8
  • Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson (2004), 'Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), May, 679-705
  • Benjamin A. Olken (2007), 'Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia', Journal of Political Economy, 115 (2), April, 200-49
  • Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel (2007), 'Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets', Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1020-48
  • Abigail Barr and Danila Serra (2010), 'Corruption and Culture: An Experimental Analysis', Journal of Public Economics, 94 (11-12), December, 862-69
  • Evidence on Regional Corruption Contagion', European Journal of Political Economy, 25 (3), September, 300-10
  • Nauro F. Campos and Francesco Giovannoni (2007), 'Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence', Public Choice, 131 (1-2), April, 1-21
  • Paolo Mauro (1995), 'Corruption and Growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), August, 681-712
  • Nathaniel H. Leff (1964), 'Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption', American Behavioral Scientist, 8 (3), November, 8-14
  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Laurent Weill (2010), 'Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?', World Development, 38 (3), March, 244-59
  • Martin Paldam (2002), 'The Cross-Country Pattern of Corruption: Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics', European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (2), June, 215-40
  • Pranab Bardhan (1997), 'Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV (3), September, 1320-46
  • Jakob Svensson (2005), 'Eight Questions about Corruption', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3), Summer, 19-42, A1-A3
  • Toke S. Aidt (2003), 'Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey', Economic Journal, 113 (491), November, F632-F652
  • Vito Tanzi (1998), 'Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures', IMF Staff Papers, 45 (4), December, 559-94
  • Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006), 'Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data', in Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Chapter 2, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 52-104
  • Theory and Applications', World Bank Economic Review, 26 (2), June, 217-35
  • Benjamin A. Olken (2009), 'Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality', Journal of Public Economics, 93 (7-8), August, 950-64
  • Axel Dreher, Christos Kotsogiannis and Steve McCorriston (2007), 'Corruption Around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model', Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (3), September, 443-66
  • Francis T. Lui (1985), 'An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery', Journal of Political Economy, 93 (4), August, 760-81
  • Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1993), 'Corruption', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3), August, 599-617
  • Toke S. Aidt and Jayasri Dutta (2008), 'Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Democracy', Economics and Politics, 20 (3), November, 335-60
  • Bård Harstad and Jakob Svensson (2011), 'Bribes, Lobbying, and Development', American Political Science Review, 105 (1), February, 46-63
  • Daniel Treisman (2007), 'What Have We Learned About the Causes Of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?', Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 211-44
  • On the Role of Collusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181-214
  • Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier (2000) 'The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption', American Economic Review, 90 (1), March, 194-211
  • Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene (1990), 'How Corruption May Corrupt', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13 (1), 63-76
  • Theo Eicher, Cecilia García-Peñalosa and Tanguy van Ypersele (2009), 'Education, Corruption, and the Distribution of Income', Journal of Economic Growth, 14 (3), September, 205-31