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200301 ||| eng |
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|a 9781498326773
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|a Monnet, Eric
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| 245 |
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|a Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle
|c Eric Monnet, Damien Puy
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2019
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| 300 |
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|a 32 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Payment Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Social Responsibility
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Regimes
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| 653 |
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|a Gold reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Gold
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Metals
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| 653 |
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|a Money
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| 653 |
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|a Metals and Metal Products
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| 653 |
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|a Central banks
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| 653 |
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|a Glass
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| 653 |
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|a Commodities
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| 653 |
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|a Standards
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| 653 |
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|a Currencies
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Government and the Monetary System
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| 653 |
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|a Diversity
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Corporate Culture
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Cement
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| 653 |
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|a Money supply
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary base
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| 653 |
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|a Ceramics
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| 653 |
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|a International reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 700 |
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|a Puy, Damien
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781498326773.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/161/001.2019.issue-161-en.xml?cid=47121-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers
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