|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
02644nmm a2200553 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB001892635 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000001055782 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
200301 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9781498325066
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Fournier, Jean-Marc
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a A Buffer-Stock Model for the Government: Balancing Stability and Sustainability
|c Jean-Marc Fournier
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2019
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 40 pages
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal stance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Treasury Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt limits
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Stabilization
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Output gap
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal multipliers
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt Management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National Deficit Surplus
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debts, Public
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Production
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Asset and liability management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Production; Economic theory
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Sovereign Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics: Production
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Cycles
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Business Fluctuations
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Financial Risk Management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Production and Operations Management
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781498325066.001
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2019/159/001.2019.issue-159-en.xml?cid=47074-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a A fiscal reaction function to debt and the cycle is built on a buffer-stock model for the government. This model inspired by the buffer-stock model of the consumer (Deaton 1991; Carroll 1997) includes a debt limit instead of the Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC). The IBC is weak (Bohn, 2007), a debt limit is more realistic as it reflects the risk of losing market access. This risk increases the welfare cost of fiscal stimulus at high debt. As a result, the higher the debt, the less governments should smooth the cycle. A larger reaction of interest rates to debt and higher hysteresis magnify this interaction between the debt level and the appropriate reaction to shocks. With very persistent shocks, the appropriate reaction to negative shocks in highly indebted countries can even be procyclical
|