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191003 ||| eng |
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|a 9781108655583
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| 050 |
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4 |
|a BJ1461
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Shaw, Elizabeth
|e [editor]
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| 245 |
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|a Free will skepticism in law and society
|b challenging retributive justice
|c edited by Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, Gregg D. Caruso
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| 260 |
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|a Cambridge
|b Cambridge University Press
|c 2019
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| 300 |
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|a viii, 238 pages
|b digital
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| 505 |
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|a Free will skepticism in law and society : an overview / Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw, and Derk Pereboom -- Free will denial and deontological constraints / Saul Smilansky -- Free will skepticism and its implications : the case for optimism / Gregg D. Caruso -- Beyond the retributive system / Bruce N. Waller -- Free will skepticism and prevention of crime / Derk Pereboom -- Deontology and deterrence for free will deniers / Benjamin Vilhauer -- Free will skepticism, general deterrence, and the "use" objection / Kevin J. Murtagh -- Fichte and psychopathy : criminal justice turned upside down / Michael Louis Corrado -- Causality and responsibility in mentally disordered offenders / John Callender -- The implications of free will skepticism for establishing criminal liability / Elizabeth Shaw -- Free will skepticism and criminal punishment : a preliminary ethical analysis / Farah Focquaert
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| 653 |
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|a Free will and determinism
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| 653 |
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|a Criminal justice, Administration of / Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Criminal justice, Administration of / Moral and ethical aspects
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Pereboom, Derk
|e [editor]
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| 700 |
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|a Caruso, Gregg D.
|e [editor]
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b CBO
|a Cambridge Books Online
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655583
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 123.5
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| 520 |
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|a 'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism
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