Toppling the Taliban air-ground operations in Afghanistan, October 2001/June 2002

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks caught the United States without a plan for military operations in Afghanistan. In less than 30 days, the Department of Defense created a plan that involved an unprecedented combination of special operations forces (SOF), Afghan fighters, and airpower. Opera...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Perry, Walter L., Kassing, David (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Santa Monica, CA RAND [2015], 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: JSTOR Open Access Books - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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100 1 |a Perry, Walter L. 
245 0 0 |a Toppling the Taliban  |h Elektronische Ressource  |b air-ground operations in Afghanistan, October 2001/June 2002  |c Walter L. Perry, David Kassing 
246 3 1 |a Air-ground operations in Afghanistan, October 2001/June 2002 
260 |a Santa Monica, CA  |b RAND  |c [2015], 2015 
300 |a 1 online resource 
505 0 |a Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceRole of the CIA; Unmanned Aircraft Systems; Intelligence Fusion Centers; Intelligence Failures; Air Operations; Basing; Control of Air Assets; The Bombing Campaign; Air-Ground Operations with Anti-Taliban Forces; Mazar-e Sharif; Kandahar; The Collapse of the Taliban; Role of Special Forces; Air and Air-Ground Operations; Conventional Ground Forces; Marines; Army Forces; Logistics; Concurrent Humanitarian Operations; The Detainees; Treatment of Detainees; National Detainee Database; Treatment in Afghanistan Facilities; Rules for the Use of Force 
505 0 |a Treatment at Camp X-RayThe Debate over Detainee Status-The U.S. Position; Arguments Against U.S. Policy; Implications; Observations; Command and Control; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; The Coalition; Humanitarian Assistance; Treatment of Detainees; CHAPTER FOUR: Hunting Down Taliban and Al Qaeda Remnants; Control of Ground Forces; Task Force 58; Formation of Task Force 58; Coordinating Operations with Pakistan; Joint and Coalition Operations; FOB Rhino; Operations; Taking the Kandahar Airport; Sensitive Site Exploitations; Detainee Operations5; Air Support Operations 
505 0 |a Cover; Title Page; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Figures and Tables; Summary; Acknowledgments; Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; A Different Kind of War for U.S. Forces; Other Military Demands of the War on Terrorism; Homeland Security; Force Protection; The War on Terrorism Outside Central Asia; Meeting the Manpower Requirements; The Area of Operations; About This Report; Purpose; Organization of This Report; CHAPTER TWO: Laying the Groundwork; The Strategic Context; Building and Managing the Coalition; The Coalition; Indigenous Partners; Joint and Covert Forces 
505 0 |a TechnologyHumanitarian Operations and Reconstruction; Pre-September 11 Planning and Operations Against Al Qaeda; Developing the War Plan: September 11-October 6, 2001; War Aims Emerged; Initial Military Planning; Intelligence Community Planning; Role of the Allies in Planning; Planning at CENTCOM; Guidance to Planners; Component and Supporting Command Planning; ARCENT Planning; CENTAF Planning; Observations; Coordination with Coalition Partners; Inter-Agency Coordination; Humanitarian Operations; Deliberate Planning; CHAPTER THREE: Toppling the Taliban; Command and Control 
505 0 |a End of MissionTora Bora; The Area of Operations; Indigenous Forces; Operations; The End Game; A Missed Opportunity; Operation ANACONDA; Planning; Execution; Roberts Ridge; End Game; Summing Up; CHAPTER FIVE: Building for the Long Run; Putting International Efforts in Place; Establishing the Interim Administration; Providing International Financial Assistance; Setting Up the International Security Assistance Force; Coordinating and Conducting Civil Affairs Activities; Stabilization Role of U.S. Forces; The Afghan National Army; Other Stability Activities 
505 0 |a Includes bibliographical references 
653 |a Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001- 
653 |a Afghan War, 2001-2021 / Campaigns 
700 1 |a Kassing, David  |e [author] 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b ZDB-39-JOA  |a JSTOR Open Access Books 
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856 4 0 |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19jcgqv  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 958.104/742 
520 |a The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks caught the United States without a plan for military operations in Afghanistan. In less than 30 days, the Department of Defense created a plan that involved an unprecedented combination of special operations forces (SOF), Afghan fighters, and airpower. Operations were initiated on October 7, and Afghanistan's Taliban government was toppled in less than two months. An interim administration was installed on December 22, and civil-military operations began. This report describes the preparations for Operation Enduring Freedom at CENTCOM and elsewhere, Army operations and support activities, building a coalition, and civil-military operations in Afghanistan through the end of June 2002. The research used contemporary records and interviews with key participants to gain authoritative perspectives on events and issues