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180730 r ||| eng |
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|z 9780833051776
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|a 9780833051776
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|a UA23
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|a Libicki, Martin C.
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|a Global demographic change and its implications for military power
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c Martin C. Libicki, Howard J. Shatz, Julie E. Taylor
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| 260 |
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|a Santa Monica, CA
|b RAND
|c 2011, 2011
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| 300 |
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|a xxviii, 141 pages
|b color illustrations
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| 505 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 131-141)
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|a Introduction -- Numbers -- Long-term trends in national GDP -- The economic burden of aging populations -- The influence of demographics on the causes of war -- The impact of demographic trends on military power projection -- Implications
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| 651 |
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|a United States / fast
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| 653 |
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|a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING / Military Science
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| 653 |
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|a HISTORY / Military / Other
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| 653 |
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|a SOCIAL SCIENCE / Demography
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Shatz, Howard J.
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Taylor, Julie E.
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-39-JOA
|a JSTOR Open Access Books
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|a Rand Corporation monograph series
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| 773 |
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|t Books at JSTOR: Open Access
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| 776 |
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|z 9780833052476
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| 776 |
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|z 0833052454
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| 776 |
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|z 0833052470
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|z 9780833052452
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| 856 |
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1091af
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 355/.033073
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| 520 |
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|a What is the impact of demographics on the prospective production of military power and the causes of war? This monograph analyzes this issue by projecting working-age populations through 2050; assessing the influence of demographics on manpower, national income and expenditures, and human capital; and examining how changes in these factors may affect the ability of states to carry out military missions. It also looks at some implications of these changes for other aspects of international security. The authors find that the United States, alone of all the large affluent nations, will continue to see (modest) increases in its working-age population thanks to replacement-level fertility rates and a likely return to vigorous levels of immigration. Meanwhile, the working-age populations of Europe and Japan are slated to fall by as much as 10 to 15 percent by 2030 and as much as 30 to 40 percent by 2050. The United States will thus account for a larger percentage of the population of its Atlantic and Pacific alliances; in other words, the capacity of traditional alliances to multiply U.S. demographic power is likely to decline, perhaps sharply, through 2050. India's working-age population is likely to overtake China's by 2030. The United States, which has 4.7 percent of the world's working-age population, will still have 4.3 percent by 2050, and the current share of global gross domestic product accounted for by the U.S. economy is likely to stay quite high
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