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180730 r ||| eng |
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|z 9780833051332
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|a 9780833051332
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|z 0833051334
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|a 0833051334
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|a JQ1786
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|a Nader, Alireza
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|a The next supreme leader
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran
|c Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, S.R. Bohandy
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| 260 |
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|a Santa Monica, CA
|b RAND
|c 2011, 2011
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| 300 |
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|a xxiii, 99 pages
|b color illustrations
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|a Introduction -- The factional balance of power -- The prevailing view of Velayat-e Faghih -- Khamenei's personal network -- Five scenarios for succession of the supreme leader in the near term -- Succession of the supreme leader in the longer term -- Concluding remarks
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-99)
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|a The Longer-Term Effects of the 2009 Election -- The Configuration of the Three Factors Will Change -- Other Factors Will Also Influence Succession in the Longer Term -- The "Old Guard" Will Disappear and Be Replaced -- Domestic Issues Will Inevitably Evolve, Putting Pressure on the Nezam to Adapt -- Iran's Relationship with the United States Will Play a Role -- Chapter 7. Concluding Remarks -- Bibliography
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|a Chapter 5. Five Scenarios for Succession of the Supreme Leader in the Near Term -- Indicators That Suggest How Factional Competition Is Evolving -- Indicators That Point to the Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih -- Indicators That Signal How Khamenei's Personal Network Is Developing and the Power It Holds -- The Configuration of the Three Factors as of 2011 -- Five Possible Scenarios for Succession of the Current Supreme Leader -- Status Quo: The Supreme Leader Remains Powerful But Not Omnipotent -- Absolutist: The Supreme Leader, a Dictator, Discards Elected Institutions -- Democratic: An Iranian-Stylized Islamic Democracy -- Leadership Council: An Executive Body Beholden to Qom -- Abolition: Demise of the Islamic Republic -- The "Wild Card" Factor: The Nature and Timing of Khamenei's Exit -- The Status Quo and Absolutist Scenarios Seem the Most Likely for the Next Succession -- Chapter 6. Succession of the Supreme Leader in the Longer Term --
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|a Preface -- Figures -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- The Official Procedure for Selecting Iran's Supreme Leader Is Laid Out in the Iranian Constitution -- In Actuality, the Next Succession Is Likely to Occur in a Much Different Way -- The Factional Balance of Power -- The Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih -- Khamenei's Personal Network -- Other Potential Factors Are Not as Relevant if the Succession Happens in the Near Term -- The Trajectory of the Next Succession Will Hinge on How the Three Principal Factors Are Configured at the Time of Khamenei's Departure -- Methodology -- Roadmap of the Report -- Chapter 2. Factor 1: The Factional Balance of Power -- The Factional Landscape in Iran -- The Islamist Right -- The Islamist Left (Reformists) -- Since the Islamic Revolution, Factionalism Has Been More Influential Than Constitutional Process in Decisionmaking and Policymaking Within the Iranian Political System --
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|a Introduction -- Factor 1: the factional balance of power -- Factor 2: the prevailing view of velayat-e faghih -- Factor 3: Khamenei's personal network -- Five scenarios for succession of the Supreme Leader in the near term -- Succession of the Supreme Leader in the longer term -- Concluding remarks
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|a Khomeini Was Able to Keep Factional Jockeying Largely in Check -- Since Khamenei Came to Power in 1989, Factional Competition Has Grown Markedly in Both Intensity and Influence -- Chapter 3. Factor 2: The Prevailing View of Velayat-e Faghih -- The Absolute View of Velayat-e Faghih -- The Democratic View of Velayat-e Faghih -- The Quietist View of Velayat-e Faghih -- Since Each Faction Has a Different View of Velayat-e Faghih, Whichever Dominates Iran's Political Landscape Will Play a Decisive Role in Shaping Succession -- Chapter 4. Factor 3: Khamenei's Personal Network -- The Members of Khamenei's Personal Network -- The Supreme Leader Has Historically Maintained a Personal Network Instrumental in Making Key Political Decisions -- Khomeini's Personal Network Was the Main Driver of the 1989 Succession -- Since the Mid-1990s, Khamenei and His Personal Network Have Steadily Consolidated Authority and Are Now the Principal Decisionmakers in Iranian Politics --
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|a Iran / fast
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|a Iran / Politics and government / 1997-
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| 653 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General
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| 653 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / General
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| 700 |
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|a Thaler, David E.
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| 700 |
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|a Bohandy, S. R.
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-39-JOA
|a JSTOR Open Access Books
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|a Rand Corporation monograph series
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| 500 |
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|a "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."
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| 773 |
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|t Books at JSTOR: Open Access
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| 776 |
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|z 0833051342
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| 776 |
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|z 9780833051349
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| 776 |
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|z 0833051997
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|z 9780833051998
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1052osd
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 320.955
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|a As the commander in chief and highest political authority in Iran, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has played a critical role in the direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has never been more true than during the tumultuous 2009 presidential elections, the outcome of which was determined by Khamenei's decisive support of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Only two men have held the position of Supreme Leader since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979: Khamenei and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As Khamenei ages and rumors of his ill health intensify, U.S. policymakers and analysts need to consider the various scenarios for succession. The eventual outcome -- what the office of the Supreme Leader looks like in Khamenei's wake -- will determine the Islamic Republic's direction. The research documented in this monograph identifies three key factors that will shape succession of the next Supreme Leader and outlines five alternative scenarios for the post-Khamenei era. For each of the factors, it provides a set of indicators that observers can use to assess the most important trends. It situates all of this within the context of the June 2009 election. Because the context in which succession would occur becomes more uncertain the further into the future one looks, the authors focus on the near term -- i.e., a succession that would take place within the next two to three years. However, the authors also speculate about the changes that are likely to ensue in the longer term if Khamenei remains Supreme Leader for the next ten years or more. In light of the 2009 election, a status quo scenario seems most likely in the near term, and an absolutist scenario is a close second. The likelihood of longer-term succession scenarios is uncertain
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