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180730 r ||| eng |
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|a 9781281181268
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| 020 |
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|z 0833039652
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|a 0833039652
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|a 1281181269
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|a 6611181261
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|a 9786611181260
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|z 9780833039651
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|a 9780833039651
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4 |
|a UF500
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Bonomo, James
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| 245 |
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|a Stealing the sword
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b limiting terrorist use of advanced conventional weapons
|c James Bonomo [and others]
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| 260 |
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|a Santa Monica, CA
|b RAND Corp.
|c 2007, 2007
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| 300 |
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|a xxvii, 126 pages
|b illustrations
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-126)
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|a Ch. 1: Introduction -- ch. 2: What types of advanced military weapons could become available to terrorists? -- ch. 3: What advanced conventional weapons are potentially most useful and attractive to terrorists? -- ch. 4: What opportunities exist for controlling weapons of particular concern? -- ch. 5: How might use controls deter terrorist organizations? -- ch. 6: Observations and implications
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| 651 |
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|a United States / fast
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| 653 |
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|a Arms control
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| 653 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)
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| 653 |
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|a Terrorism / Prevention
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| 653 |
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|a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism
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| 653 |
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|a Weapons systems
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-39-JOA
|a JSTOR Open Access Books
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| 500 |
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|a "MG-510"--Page 4 of cover
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|t Books at JSTOR: Open Access
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| 776 |
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|z 0833042874
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| 776 |
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|z 9780833042873
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| 856 |
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|u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg510dhs
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 363.325/16
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| 520 |
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|a Part of a series examining the technology competition between security organizations and terrorist organizations, this report focuses on understanding how terrorist groups make technology choices and consequently how the United States can discourage their adoption of advanced conventional weapons. Five types of advanced conventional weapons are identified that could provide terrorists with a new and qualitatively different weapon capability: sniper rifles, squad-level weapons, antitank missiles, large limpet mines, and mortar systems. Two key methods of limiting the threat from these systems in the hands of terrorists are explored: raising awareness of the threat, and reducing the threat through procedural and technical use controls. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can play a key role in both these steps by pushing to begin diplomatic discussions and by conducting a detailed study, perhaps with the National Security Agency, of the technical architecture for use controls. Additionally, DHS should become a permanent member of the interagency panels considering arms exports
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