The economics of contracts [Research Reviews]
Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), 'An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting', Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473-94 -- Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1),...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Cheltenham, UK
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
2008
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| Series: | The international library of critical writings in economics
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Edward Elgar eBook Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1992), 'An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting', Review of Economic Studies, 59 (3), July, 473-94 -- Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105 (1), February, 1-29 Patrick Bolton and David S. Scharfstein (1990), 'A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 93-106 Bengt Holmström (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), Autumn, 324-40 -- Guillermo A. Calvo and Stanislaw Wellisz (1978), 'Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimal Size of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 86 (5), October, 943-52 -- Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), 'A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 349-64 -- Jean Tirole (1986), 'Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (2), Fall, 181-214 -- Mathias Dewatripont (1989), 'Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (3), August, 589-619 -- Oliver D. Hart and Jean Tirole (1988), 'Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics', Review of Economic Studies, 55 (4), October, 509-40 -- Robert M. Townsend (1979), 'Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification', Journal of Economic Theory, 21 (2), October, 265-93 -- Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry', American Economic Review, 77 (3), June, 388-401 -- J.A. Mirrlees (1999), 'The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I', Review of Economic Studies, 66, 3-21 -- Bengt Holmström (1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (1), Spring, 74-91 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), 'An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem', Econometrica, 51 (1), January 7-45 -- Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom (1990), 'Multitask Principal- Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52 -- Recommended readings (Machine generated): J.A. Mirrlees (1971), 'An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation', Review of Economic Studies, 38 (2), April, 175-208 -- Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), 'Monopoly and Product Quality', Journal of Economic Theory, 18 (2), August, 301-17 -- Michael Spence (1973), 'Job Market Signaling', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 (3), August, 355-74 -- Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole (1992), 'The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values', Econometrica, 60 (1), January, 1-42 -- Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz (1976), 'Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90 (4), November, 629-49 -- B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1986), 'Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CI (1), February, 1-31 -- M. Dewatripont and E. Maskin (1995), 'Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies', Review of Economic Studies, 62 (4), October, 541-55 -- Robert M. Townsend (1982), 'Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information', Journal of Political Economy, 90 (6), December, 1166-86 -- Edward J. Green (1987), 'Lending and the Smoothing of Uninsurable Income', in Edward C. Prescott (ed) and Neil Wallace (ed) (eds), Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade, Minnesota Studies in Macroeconomics series, Volume I, Chapter I, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 3-25 -- William P. Rogerson (1985), 'Repeated Moral Hazard', Econometrica, 53 (1), January, 69-76 -- Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom (1987), 'Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives', Econometrica, 55 (2), March, 303-28 -- Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (1986), 'Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3, Part I), June, 614-41 -- Eric Maskin ([1977] 1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, 66, 23-38 -- Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), 'Incentives and Incomplete Information', Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25-45 -- Roger B. Myerson (1981), 'Optimal Auction Design', Mathematics of Operation Research, 6 (1), February, 58-73 -- Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite (1983), 'Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading', Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2), April, 265-81 -- Jacques Crémer and Richard P. McLean (1985), 'Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent', Econometrica, 53 (2), March, 345-61 -- John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-220 W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson (1989), 'Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment', Econometrica, 57 (2), March, 447-80 -- Jonathan Levin (2003), 'Relational Incentive Contracts', American Economic Review, 93 (3), June, 835-57 -- Bengt Holmström (1999), 'Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective', Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), Special Issue, January, 169-82 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Oliver Hart and John Moore (1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (6), December, 1119-58 -- Patrick Bolton and Michael D. Whinston (1993), 'Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance', Review of Economic Studies, 60 (1), January, 121-48 -- The Economics of Contracts provides a guided tour to the leading ideas in contract theory. It assembles some of the foundational writings on contracting under limited and asymmetric information, incentives and mechanism design. It contains, in particular, the key contributions of five recent Nobel Prize winners in economics and brings together the most important articles that have followed these path-breaking works |
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| Physical Description: | p |
| ISBN: | 9781785366772 |