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180626 ||| eng |
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|a 9781849808118
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|a 9781848446571
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4 |
|a HD5706
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|a Coleman, William Oliver
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| 245 |
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|a The political economy of wages and unemployment
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b a neoclassical exploration
|c William Oliver Coleman
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| 260 |
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|a Cheltenham, U.K
|b Edward Elgar
|c 2010
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| 300 |
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|a viii, 342 p
|b ill
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment / Political aspects
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| 653 |
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|a Labor market / Political aspects
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-1-EWE
|a Edward Elgar eBook Archive
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| 856 |
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|u https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781848446571.xml
|3 Volltext
|x Verlag
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a 1. The problem labour monopoly might solve -- 2. The fall and rise of labour monopoly theory -- 3. How a wage bill hill creates a wage rate floor -- 4. Why the floor will fluctuate -- 5. How bargaining may build a ceiling instead of a floor -- 6. How foresight may (and may not) defeat the floor -- 7. Why the 'property-owning democracy' may nationalize capital rather than regulate labour -- 8. Unemployment as a benefit of unemployment benefits -- 9. Why the majority may choose the wage of the minority -- 10. Rigidity and volatility in the face of the cycle : a neoklassikal analysis -- 11. Labour monopoly as the source of money wage rigidity : a hypothesis -- 12. A concluding comment
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| 520 |
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|a In this tightly argued work William Coleman explores the macroeconomic implications of politically based restraints on competition in labour markets
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