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180626 ||| eng |
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|a 9781784712730
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| 050 |
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4 |
|a HB99.5
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Davis, Kevin E.
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| 245 |
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|a Institutions and economic performance
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b [Research Reviews]
|c edited by Kevin E. Davis
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| 260 |
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|a Cheltenham, UK
|b Edward Elgar
|c c2010
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| 300 |
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|a xx, 654 p
|b ill
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| 653 |
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|a Institutional economics
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| 653 |
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|a Economic development
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| 653 |
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|a Industrial productivity
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| 653 |
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|a Institutional economics / Case studies
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b ZDB-1-EWE
|a Edward Elgar eBook Archive
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| 490 |
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|a The international library of critical writings in economics
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| 856 |
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|u https://www.elgaronline.com/view/Research_Reviews/9781843768722/9781843768722.xml
|3 Volltext
|x Verlag
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330.1552
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| 520 |
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|a Peter Evans (1992), 'The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change' in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds), The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Politics, and the State, Chapter 3, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 139-81 -- Mancur Olson (1993), 'Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development', American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567-76 -- William J. Baumol (1990), 'Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive', Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5 pt.1), 893-921 -- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England', Journal of Economic History, XLIX (4), December, 803-32 -- Timothy Besley (1995), 'Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana', Journal of Political Economy, 103 (5), October, 903-37 --
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| 520 |
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|a ... the book is a good example of the writing and reasoning style, sometimes vivid and intriguing, often used by NIE authors. Similarly, the book is a good sample of NIE's multidisciplinary approach to economics. . . The range of papers presented gives the reader a good picture of the variety of approaches used by NIE scholars, and their ability to integrate sociological and legal consideration within the economic analysis.' - Martino Bianchi, CEU Political Science Journal The field of institutional economics has witnessed a surge in interest over recent years and has attracted the attention of a growing number of social scientists. This topical and highly informative collection brings together critical writings on the relationship between institutions and economic performance. The included works encompass seminal cross-country studies of 'whether institutions matter', as well as leading examples of within-country studies on the role of specific institutions. This indispensable volume includes an original introduction by the editor which explores the definition and measurement of institutions. The book is essential reading for anyone interested in institutions and economic development
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| 520 |
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|a Recommended readings (Machine generated): John R. Commons (1931), 'Institutional Economics', American Economic Review, 21 (4), December, 648-57 -- Douglass C. North (1994), 'Economic Performance Through Time', American Economic Review, 84 (3), June, 359-68 -- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001), 'The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation', American Economic Review, 91 (5), December 1369-401 -- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002), 'Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4), November, 1231-94 -- Edward L. Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2004), 'Do Institutions Cause Growth?', Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 271-303 --
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| 520 |
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|a Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2008), 'The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins', Journal of Economic Literature, XLVI (2), June, 285-332 -- Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard (2003), 'Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect', European Economic Review, 47, 165-95 -- Samuel Bowles (1998), 'Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI, March, 75-111 -- Dani Rodrik (2000), 'Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them', Studies in Comparative International Development, 35 (3), Fall, 3-31 --
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| 520 |
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|a Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess (2000), 'Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence From India', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXV, May, 389-430 -- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005), 'History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India', American Economic Review, 95 (4), September, 1190-213 -- Avner Greif (1994), 'Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies', Journal of Political Economy, 102 (5), October, 912-50 -- Richard A. Posner (1980), 'A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law', Journal of Law and Economics, 23 (1), April, 1-53 -- Vernon W. Ruttan and Yujiro Hayami (1984), 'Toward a Theory of Induced Institutional Innovation', Journal of Development Studies, 20 (4), July, 203-23
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