Modern monetary policy and central bank governance [Research Reviews]

'In the aftermath of the crisis, redesigning the institutional framework governing money and finance to foster financial stability has become a priority. This volume brings together key contributions that help elucidate the economic and political complexity that must be addressed to improve the...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Eijffinger, Sylvester
Other Authors: Masciandaro, Donato
Format: eBook
Published: Cheltenham Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd 2014
Series:Elgar research reviews in economics
Online Access:
Collection: Edward Elgar eBook Archive - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Summary:'In the aftermath of the crisis, redesigning the institutional framework governing money and finance to foster financial stability has become a priority. This volume brings together key contributions that help elucidate the economic and political complexity that must be addressed to improve the governance of central banks and their contribution to economic and financial stability.'--Athanasios Orphanides, Professor of the Practice of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan School of Management. There has been a recent evolution in the relationship between modern monetary policy and central banking, visible in the now merged study of public economic choices made every day and the features of monetary architectures and institutions. Though previously separate focuses, these are now accepted by academic scholars and policymakers to be two critical areas that are intrinsically linked. Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governance explores this change by bringing together the best research from experts in the field to achieve a comprehensive examination of the subject, innovatively addressing its two critical angles in a single volume
John B. Taylor (1993), 'Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, December, 195-214 -- Dale W. Henderson and Warwick J. McKibbin (1993), 'A Comparison of Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, December, 221-317 -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1993), 'Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, December, 53-84
Masciandaro, D. and Passarelli, F. (2014), Banking Bailouts and Distributive Monetary Policy: Voting on Central Bank Independence, Working Paper Series, Paolo Baffi Centre, Bocconi University, Milan, (forthcoming) -- Siklos, P.L. and Sturm, J.-E. (eds) (2013), Central Bank Communication, Decision Making, and Governance: Issues, Challenges, and Case Studies, CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA -- Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace (1981), 'Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5 (3), Fall, 1-17 -- Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon (1983), 'Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (1), 101-21 -- Kenneth Rogoff (1985), 'The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (4), November, 1169-89 --
Bennett T. McCallum (1995), 'Two Fallacies Concerning Central- Bank Independence', American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 85 (2), May, 207-11 -- Adam S. Posen (1995), 'Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence', in Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J. Rotemberg (eds), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 253-74 -- Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker (1995), 'Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?', Oxford Economic Papers, 47 (4), October, 539-60 -- Clive Briault, Andrew Haldane and Mervyn King (1996), 'Central Bank Independence and Accountability: Theory and Evidence', Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, February, 63-8 -- Otmar Issing (2005), 'Communication, Transparency, Accountability: Monetary Policy in the Twenty-First Century', Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 87 (2, Part 1), March/ April, 65-83 --
Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Petra M. Geraats (2006), 'How Transparent Are Central Banks?', European Journal of Political Economy, 22 (1), March, 1-21 -- Alex Cukierman and Allan H. Meltzer (1986), 'A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information', Econometrica, 54 (5), September, 1099-128 -- Marvin Goodfriend (1986), 'Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking', Journal of Monetary Economics, 17 (1), January, 63-92 -- Alan S. Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Jakob de Haan and David-Jan Jansen (2008), 'Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence', Journal of Economic Literature, 46 (4), December, 910-45
Recommended readings (Machine generated): Backus, D. and Driffill, J. (1985), Inflation and Reputation, American Economic Review, 75, 530-538 -- Bernanke, B. (2004), 'Fedspeak', Remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, San Diego, CA, January 3rd -- De Haan, J., Eijffinger, S.C.W. and Rybinski, K. (eds) (2007), Special Issue: Central Bank Transparency and Central Bank Communication, European Journal of Political Economy, 23, 1-260 -- Eijffinger, S.C.W. and Masciandaro, D. (eds) (2011), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision: After the Financial Crisis, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA -- King, M. (2005), Monetary Policy: Practice Ahead of Theory, 2005 Mais Lecture, Cass Business School, London, May 17th -- Kohn, D.L. and Sack, B. (2004), Central Bank Talk: Does It Matter and Why?, in Bank of Canada (ed.), Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability, Bank of Canada, Ottawa, 175-206 --
Susanne Lohmann (1992), 'Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility', American Economic Review, 82 (1), March, 273-86 -- Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Marco Hoeberichts (1998), 'The Trade Off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness', Oxford Economic Papers, Special Issue on the Economics of Central Bank Independence, 50 (3), July, 397-411 -- Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler (1995), 'Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (4), Autumn, 27-48 -- Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí and Mark Gertler (1999), 'The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII (4), December, 1661-707 -- Michael Woodford (2003), 'Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing', Review of Economic Studies, 70 (4), October, 861-86 --
Carl E. Walsh (1995), 'Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers', American Economic Review, 85 (1), March, 150-67 -- Lars E.O. Svensson (1997), 'Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts', American Economic Review, 87 (1), March, 98-114 -- Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini (1991), 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries', Economic Policy, 6 (13), October, 341-92 -- Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti (1992), 'Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes', World Bank Economic Review, 6 (3), September, 353-98 -- Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), 'Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 25 (2), May, 151-62 --
Physical Description:1 v