Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments

Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preference...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Blöchliger, Hansjörg
Other Authors: Pinero Campos, José Maria
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Paris OECD Publishing 2011
Series:OECD Economics Department Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: OECD Books and Papers - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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520 |a Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preferences, increases the efficiency of the public sector and avoids tax and spending excesses, others argue that tax competition leads to a distorted tax structure, to growing tax rate disparities and to an under-provision of public services. The main conclusions of the paper are: tax competition is stronger on mobile taxes (corporate and personal income tax) than on immobile taxes (property tax, consumption taxes); tax rates tend to be lower in wealthier jurisdictions; there is little evidence of a "race to the bottom" with respect to tax rates and tax revenues; and inter-jurisdictional differences in tax raising capacity - or economic wealth - appear to be lower in countries with more tax competition. Governments considering tax competition "excessive" may introduce or amend fiscal equalisation; increase sub-central property taxation and reduce other sub-central taxes; or harmonise the tax bases of sub-central governments to some extent